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Jn S ep tem b er  1998, the  C anad ian  W ar M u se u m  in it ia te d  a v is itin g  
speaker series to m ake available to the 
g en era l p ub lic  the  la te s t  research , 
debate  and  opinion on C anadian and  
international military history. Like the  
M useum 's highly popular f ilm  series, 
the ta lks were usually  held on w eek  
nights a n d  carried no adm ission  fe e .
They have proven highly successfu l, both w ith  
M useum  visitors a n d  invited  sp e a ke rs . The 
la t te r  h a v e  in c lu d e d  e m in e n t  C a n a d ia n  
historians like Terry Copp, David Bercuson and  
Bill M cAndrew, a n d  international scholars like 
Jo h n  Keegan, Paul Gough, a n d  C hristopher  
Pugsley. In the au tum n  o f 2000, the M useum  
will welcome world-renowned First World War 
scholar Ja y  W inter and  Pulitzer Prize w inner 
J a m es  McPherson.
The M useum  staged  one o f these  even ts to 
co incide  w ith  the  5 0 th  a n n iv e rsa ry  o f  the  
o u tbreak  o f the  Korean War. In  ad d itio n  to 
hosting several hundred  Korean War veterans
during the  a n n iversa ry  w e e k e n d  o f 
June  24-25, updating its Korean War 
p e rm a n e n t gallery, a n d  m ounting  a 
travelling exhibit o f contemporary war 
p h o to g ra p h s , th e  M u se u m  in v ite d  
D alhousie University pro fessor Denis 
S ta ir s  to c o m m e n t on  C a n a d a 's  
diplom atic role in the crisis fro m  the  
perspective o f 50 years. This, in effect, 
a m o u n te d  to a  r e c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  the  
argum ents f ir s t  p resen ted  in Professor Stairs' 
sem ina l work, The Diplomacy of C onstrain t, 
which, tw enty-five years after its publication, 
r e m a in s  th e  s ta n d a r d  w o rk  in  th e  f ie ld .  
Speaking  on Sunday , 25 June 2000, f i f ty  years 
to the  d a y  a fte r  N orth  K orean  fo r c e s  f i r s t  
c r o s s e d  th e  3 8 th  p a r a lle l  to in v a d e  th e  
A m erican-supported Republic o f Korea in the 
south, the text o f his address fo llow s. Like the 
monograph on w hich it com m ents, the article 
constitu tes a  critical com ponent o f C anada's  
Korean War literature, a  tour d e fo rc e  by one 
o f Canada's m ost g ifted  scholars.
O n  th is  very  day  50  y e a rs , five h o u rs  an d  four m inu tes ago, Lester B. P earso n ’s 
personal secretary, Mary M acdonald, tu n ed  her 
radio to the CBC. It was 2:00 pm  — time to settle 
back  in her cottage on Lac G auvreau to listen, 
as w as her custom , to the  weekly new s ro u n d ­
up , Capital Report. The a n n o u n c e r’s lead was 
more dram atic th an  usual. Fighting, he said, had 
broken out on the Korean peninsula. The United 
N ations S ecu rity  C ouncil w as a t  th a t  very 
m om ent convening in  em ergency session  to 
c o n s id e r  how  to resp o n d . C a n a d a ’s ac tin g  
p e rm an en t represen ta tive  to the  UN, J o h n  W. 
Holmes, had  been  despatched  to observe its 
proceedings, even though C anada w as no t then  
one of the  C ouncil’s m em bers.
At th is  p o in t the  figh ting  in  K orea h ad  
actually been underw ay for nearly 24 hours. But 
in  the  O ttaw a of 1950 reactions cam e a t a more 
le isu re ly  pace  th a n  th e y  do now . A nd on 
w eekends, they  cam e a t a sna il’s pace. In their 
h a b ita ts  of re s t an d  recreation , even the  m ost 
substan tia l of the notables of governm ent lacked 
telephones. Mary M acdonald, a ttu n ed  to th is as 
to so m uch else, surm ised th a t the Acting U nder­
secretary , Escott Reid, m ight not have heard  the 
news. Nor Mr. Pearson, either. Since Reid h ad  a 
farm  nearby  on Lac G auvreau, too, she decided 
to pop over to tell h im  the tale. As it happened , 
he w as o u t rowing on the w ater w ith h is  son, 
who w as celebrating h is  b irthday . So she  took 
possession of ano ther boat and pu rsu ed  the two
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of them  on th is high sea  of the G atineau Hills — 
h e r arrival alongside no t being regarded  by the 
A cting  U n d e r -S e c re ta ry  a s  a  p a r t ic u la r ly  
welcome intrusion at a time of family conviviality. 
Having no telephone in h is  coun try  hom e, and  
having no desire either to re tu rn  to Ottawa before 
the evening, Reid b ro u g h t the  genius of the 
diplom at to the  task  of resolving the conflict 
betw een his duty  to the sta te  and  his du ty  to his 
son. M acdonald, it was soon agreed, would drive 
the 16 m iles it would tak e  to get to the Pearson  
cottage, and inform the Minister. And so she did. 
P e a rs o n  h a v in g  no  te le p h o n e  e ith e r , sh e  
tran sp o rted  him  yet a n o th e r two miles to the 
n ea re s t public booth, in  Larrim ac, w here he 
called  th e  D e p a rtm en t. In th e  ligh t of the  
intelligence he then  received, he p u t th ro u g h  a 
second call, this time to the Prime Minister, Louis 
St. L auren t, in St. Patrice. The two m en agreed 
th a t the response to the invasion would depend 
entirely on the Am ericans, since in the w estern  
w orld of 1950 only th e  U n ited  S ta te s  h a d  
s ig n if ic a n t m ilita ry  fo rces a t  its  d isp o sa l. 
Certainly the UN itself h a d  none to deploy. B ut 
in the unlikely event th a t  a m ilitary response  
did ensue, they hoped it would be under United 
Nations ausp ices. O therw ise, there  w as a risk  
th a t a local conflict in Korea w ould tu rn  into a
global conflagration between the com m unist and 
a n ti-c o m m u n is t pow ers. In th e  m ean tim e, 
however, there  was no need to h u rry  back  to 
O ttaw a, since there  w as noth ing  of su b s tan ce  
th a t  C a n a d a  a t  th is  p o in t co u ld  do. T he
Department of External Affairs — or tha t very
sm all p a rt  of it, a t any  ra te , th a t was now  alert 
to the  action  on the w eekend cables — would 
keep ab reast of developm ents well enough until 
Monday morning.
S uch  w as the initial response  of those in 
O ttaw a’s h ighest places to the  ou tb reak  of the 
w ar in  Korea. Their reaction  even th en  gave 
testim ony to two enduring  charac te ris tics  of 
C a n a d a ’s d iplom acy in the  po litico -security  
context — the first of them  a m anifestation  of 
geopolitical reality, the  second an  expression of 
stra teg ic  practice. The geopolitical reality  was 
that in the context of any truly significant security 
confrontation, the m ost cen tral d e te rm inan t of 
th e  C a n a d ia n  re sp o n se  w as th e  A m erican  
response. The definition of the C anad ian  policy 
prob lem , in o th e r  w ords, w as u ltim a te ly  a 
fu n c tio n  of how, in  rea c tin g  to c ris is , the  
A m ericans decided to behave. The expression 
of strategic practice was the desire to ensure tha t 
the substantive American reaction, if substantive 
reaction  there  w as to be, would be conducted  
u n d e r m ultila teral ausp ices — ausp ices th a t 
would give o ther players (C anada am ong them) 
an entitlem ent to join in the policy-making game. 
Am ericans doing it w ith o thers were more likely 
to be sensible th a n  A m ericans doing it alone.
Now, as you have heard , I indulged in a wee 
b it of rum ina ting  on th is  sub jec t a q u a r te r - 
cen tu ry  ago, an d  D ean Oliver h as  asked  me to 
revisit my argum ents again tonight, and to report 
in particu lar on how I th ink  they stand  up  in the 
light of su b seq u en t scho larsh ip  an d  la tte r-d ay  
perspectives. A flattering request, I flatter myself 
to think! But also a dangerous one. Most average 
m ortals, after all, do no t take  warm ly to the 
thought of confessing their errors in public. And 
on m a tte r s  th a t  to u c h  u p o n  th e ir  van ity , 
academ ics are lesser m ortals by far th a n  even 
the average! T h a t I h a d  no access then , as 
scho lars have enjoyed m ore recently, to the 
classified files of the D epartm ent of External
Lester B, Pearson was Minister of External Relations 
at the outbreak of the Korean War.
Affairs m ay provide a m easu re  of defence, if 
defence is required, b u t only a m odest one. A 
book, after all, w as one of the vehicles th rough  
w hich my prejudices were conveyed to a sm all 
and  u n su sp ec tin g  public. P art of the  cost of 
publication w as m et by the Social Sciences and 
H um anities R esearch  Council of C anada, and  
hence u ltim ately by the taxpayer. T hat being so,
I certainly had  an  obligation to get the basic story 
basically right!
In spite  of the  high risk  of em barrassm en t, 
however, I will do my best, and  I will begin w ith 
a brief outline of the  cen tral a rgum en t of my 
in terp re ta tion , so very long ago, of C anad ian  
policy. I will th e n  ru n  quickly  th ro u g h  the  
e s se n tia ls  of the  d ip lom atic  ta le , from  the  
C anad ian  poin t of view, as a m eans of draw ing 
ou t the  evidence th a t  I th o u g h t served well 
enough  to es tab lish  my case. T ha t evidence 
cen tres on a sequence of issues, or decision- 
poin ts, to w hich the  C anad ian  foreign policy 
estab lishm ent h ad  to respond as the diplom atic 
gam e unfolded in  tandem  with the w ar itself.
In the light of all th is, I will th en  a ttem p t to 
take fair note of new findings and  countervailing 
interpretations. The latter, I think, have more to 
do w ith the expectations of the writers th a n  with 
the facts of the  case, an d  the form er (I like to 
think) do not m atte r very m uch. B ut these  are 
d o u b tle ss  se lf-se rv ing  op in ions, a n d  I will 
therefore rely on the  questioners  a t the  end  to 
bring  my vanities to heel.
The Argument
My core a rgum ent w ent som ething like this: C anad ian  forces ostensibly  fought in  the 
K orean War u n d e r the  ausp ices of the  United 
N ations, and  in fulfilm ent of the  principle of 
collective security . After all, one s ta te  actor 
(N o rth  K orea), a l th o u g h  n o t  u n iv e r s a l ly  
recognized as a legitim ate sovereign power, had  
w ith o u t w a rn in g  la u n c h e d  a co n v en tio n a l 
military invasion of its neighbour. The neighbour 
being unable to m ount a successful defence, the 
m atter had  been b rought before the UN Security 
Council. The Council had  immediately called for 
the  resto ra tion  of peace and  the w ithdraw al of 
the invading forces. W hen the invaders refused 
to comply, an  in ternational posse was called out, 
an d  the United S ta tes  was asked  to lead it.
C anada jo ined  the  posse. On the surface, and 
on th is som ew hat legalistic account, the UN was 
w o rk in g  in  p re c is e  a c c o rd  w ith  b o th  th e  
pu rposes and  p rocedures of C hap ter VII of its 
Charter.
B ut the  real politics of the en terprise, as 
opposed  to its  tech n ica l form , h a d  a m ore 
am biguous look. In particu lar, they seem ed to 
have less to do w ith “collective secu rity” th an  
w ith  “c o n ta in m e n t” — th e  d o c tr in a l  
m an ifesta tion  in the  post-w ar period  of the 
p r in c ip le  of c o u n te rv a i l in g  pow er. M ore 
co n c re te ly , th e  N o rth  K orean  a t ta c k  w as 
perceived in the west, and  with special conviction 
in the United States, as an  aggression authorized, 
if not actually initiated, by the Soviet Union, and 
th e  p re c e d e n t  t h a t  cam e  im m e d ia te ly  to 
P residen t T ru m a n ’s m ind as he a ssessed  its 
im plications w as H itler’s challenge to Neville 
C ham berlain  a t M unich .1 A ppeasem ent as a 
policy h ad  not w orked then . Hence it would not 
be tried again now. There would be no w hetting 
of au to c ra tic  appe tites . A m ilitary  response  
would therefore be launched , an d  to legitimize 
it, the suppo rt of the Security Council would be 
p u r s u e d , a n d  c o n tr ib u tio n s  from  pow ers 
sim ilarly opposed to ac ts of m ilitary aggression 
thereby  obtained. B ut of course the “powers 
sim ilarly opposed” were for the m ost p a rt allies 
of the  United S ta tes  (the two “n e u tra ls” am ong 
them  — India and  Sweden — ultim ately confined 
them selves to the  provision of m edical units). 
Certainly they included no representative of the 
S in o -S o v ie t w o rld . T h is  w as a co ld  w ar 
confrontation dressed up  as a collective security 
police action.
From  the C anadian  point of view, this m ight 
not have m atte red  very m uch. Happy, after all, 
is the  coun try  th a t  can  identify its security  a t 
home w ith a peaceful order in the world a t large. 
Such a circum stance allows the cosmetic politics 
of form an d  the p rac tica l politics of action to be 
conveniently aligned. B ut in th is particu lar case 
the a lignm ent cam e w ith  a cost an d  a risk. The 
cost w as the obligation to con tribu te  to the 
conduct of the  hostilities — an  obligation th a t 
W ashington successfully  triggered as soon as it 
w ent to the UN for support. The risk  w as th a t 
the Am ericans, as the leading cham pions of the 
w estern  cause  in the  cold w ar context, would 
becom e excessively excited an d  overplay their 
hand . There w as a need, therefore, to keep a
close  eye on  th e ir  b e h a v io u r , a n d  w h ere  
necessary  to m oderate it. This could only be 
done by acting together with o ther powers of like 
m ind an d  sim ilar pu rpose  — a p rospec t th a t 
becam e som ew hat m ore feasible as soon as the 
United N ations was invoked as the organization 
th rough  w hich the w estern  response  would be 
processed  and  legitimized. P u t in  o ther term s, 
the advan tage  to the  A m ericans of w orking 
through the UN was th a t it forced countries like 
C an ad a  to p u t  th e ir  re so u rc es  w here th e ir  
m o u th s  h ad  been. The d isad v an tag e  to the 
A m ericans w as th a t they would th en  have to 
g ran t th e ir  political and  m ilitary  su p p o rte rs  
abroad  at lea s t some en titlem ent to m eddle in 
decisions th a t  W ashington would really have 
preferred to m ake entirely  on its own. (Indeed, 
for a t least one experienced Am erican observer 
and  p rac titio n er of foreign policy, George F. 
K ennan , th is  d isa d v an tag e  ou tw eighed  the  
p o litic a l r e tu rn ;  h e  th e re fo re  w ou ld  h ave  
preferred  to ignore the  UN entirely, an d  m oun t 
a  purely  un ila tera l response .2)
In th is general context — or so my argum ent 
w ent then , an d  still, in essence, goes now  — 
C anadian diplomacy during the Korean War can 
be in terp reted  very largely as a m anifestation of 
th e  a t t e m p t  to  s u p p o r t  th e  c o re , w h ile  
sim ultaneously  con tain ing  the extrem ities, of 
A m erican policy, and  to en su re  th a t m ilitary 
fo rces o p e ra tin g  u n d e r  UN a u s p ic e s , b u t  
delegated to US com m and, were prevented from 
being d raw n in to  a  larger A sian war. From  
O ttaw a’s poin t of view, after all, the E uropean  
theatre, and  the North Atlantic com m unity more 
generally, seem ed to m atte r  a whole lot m ore. I 
em phasize here  my use  of the  term  “a tte m p t.” 
As I w arned my readers long ago, the C anadians 
“m et w ith only m arginal success  — they would 
say now th a t  they did as well as conditions 
allowed, and  th a t in any case a sm all advance is 
be tte r th a n  none at a ll.” B ut successfu l or not, 
the effort itself w as cen tral to the ir diplomacy, 
and  hence it becam e cen tral also to my own 
thesis.3
Issues and Decision-Points
T ie  specific item s of evidence upon  w hich I founded th is som ew hat sweeping, if happily 
econom ical, analysis can  get a  little ted ious in 
the telling, so I am  going to keep the telling brief.
My recitation will am ount, in fact, to only a trifle 
m ore th a n  a bare-bones list, an d  the list itself 
will be selective. This will be m uch  k inder to 
you. (Critics, no doubt, will a s se rt later th a t it 
h a s  also been  k inder to me, since they will 
assum e I have selected the evidence th a t causes 
my argum ent the least inconvenience. D on’t we 
all!)
I begin my list with a  rem inder of w hat I have 
told you already, which is th a t Pearson and  St. 
L au ren t agreed  a t the  very o u tse t th a t  any 
substantive response to the North Korean attack 
should  ideally be conducted through the United 
Nations. This m ay have been partly  a reflection 
of their in terest in susta in ing  the UN experim ent 
itself, b u t by 1950 there were very few in External 
Affairs who still though t there  m ight be som e 
real stuffing in the collective security model. The 
more im portan t consideration was th a t th is was 
the m ost prom ising way of depositing  Gulliver 
in Lilliput,4 an d  hence of giving the L illiputians 
a t least som e  opportun ity  to lim it the dam age 
h is m ovem ents m ight otherw ise cause. O ttaw a 
w as therefo re  h ap p y  to su p p o rt  the  in itia l 
Security Council resolution, passed  on th a t first 
S unday  afternoon in  New York, calling on the 
invaders to withdraw.
Having sa id  that, however, ne ither Pearson  
no r St. L aurent, nor for th a t m a tte r  their m ost 
influential foreign service advisers (among them , 
H um e Wrong in  W ashington an d  Jo h n  Holmes 
in New York), thought it likely th a t the Americans 
would actually  do any th ing  th a t would really 
m atter, and  they were probably as su rp rised  as 
th e  N orth  K o rean s a n d  th e  S ov ie ts  w h en  
P residen t T ru m an  began to take m ilitary step s 
to intervene. As soon as he did so, C anad ian  
p reoccupations becam e a t once very visible. 
More specifically, the President late on Monday, 
Ju n e  26, ordered G eneral M acA rthur in  Tokyo 
to give com bat a ir an d  naval su p p o rt to the 
re trea tin g  S o u th  K oreans, an d  to move the 
S even th  F leet in to  the  F orm osa  S tra it (the 
p u rp o se  of th e  la t te r  b e in g  to  p re v e n t an  
o u tb re a k  of para lle l h o stilitie s  betw een the 
Form osans and  the m ainland Chinese). The plan 
w a s  to  a n n o u n c e  th e s e  in i t ia t iv e s  in  a 
p residen tia l radio  b roadcast a t 12:00 noon on 
Tuesday, and  th en  to have them  approved p o st  
fa c to  in the Security Council a t its next meeting, 
w hich w as schedu led  to begin two h o u rs  later, 
a t 2:00 pm.
Prime Minister Louis S t Laurent (with hand on hat) preparing to leave on a 
US Army helicopter following a visit to the 25th Field Dressing Station in Korea.
P earson  w as inform ed of all th is  by the 
A m erican  a m b a s s a d o r  in O ttaw a  (S tan ley  
Woodward) early on Tuesday m orning, and  after 
re f le c tio n  h e  te le p h o n e d  H um e W rong in  
W ashington to com plain about the tim ing of the 
P residen t’s public announcem ent, arguing th a t 
it would be b e tte r if it cam e after, ra th e r  th an  
before, the decision to intervene h a d  received 
Security  Council au thorization . I w as unaw are 
w hen I did my original work, b u t  have since 
learned  from the  E x ternal Affairs docum ents, 
th a t  he was also concerned ab o u t som e of the 
in f la m m a to ry  r h e to r ic  in  th e  te x t  of th e  
P re s id e n t’s a d d re s s  (it m ade reference , for 
exam ple, to “C om m unist im peria lism ”), and  
ab o u t the  decision to intervene in  the  Form osa 
S trait (which in his view had  the effect of tu rn ing  
F o rm o s a  in to  a “U .S . p r o te c to r a te ,” th e  
im plication p resum ab ly  being th a t  th is  would 
in t r o d u c e  d a n g e r o u s  a n d  u n n e c e s s a r y  
com plications to an  already volatile situa tion).5 
At any rate, the central preoccupation of senior 
C anadian  policy-m akers was already very clear. 
They w anted  the Am ericans to stop acting — or 
a t least to stop appearing  to ac t — unilaterally , 
and  they were also concerned no t only to lim it 
the  scope of the  conflict, b u t also to tre a t it as
su i generis , an d  therefore containable, ra th e r 
th a n  as generic to the cold w ar as a  whole.
None of th is  h ad  m uch  p ractical effect. The 
P residen t’s b ro ad cas t w ent ahead  as p lanned , 
an d  the collective security  response w as duly 
au tho rized  (in the  fo rtu itous absence  of the 
Soviet Union from  the  Security  Council) on 
Tuesday afternoon.
B ut there  w as soon to be an o th er round. 
More specifically, as the  hostilities escalated  at 
the end of the week, and  as it becam e clear th a t 
a m ajor m ilitary cam paign would have to be 
m ounted, there was an  urgen t need to establish  
an  official UN m ilitary com m and. In the absence 
of a  working com m and s tru c tu re  w ithin the UN 
organization itself, and in a context in which only 
the  A m ericans were in a  position to m ake a 
decisive m ilita ry  c o n tr ib u tio n , th e  obvious 
so lu tion  w as to delegate the ta sk  to the  United 
S ta te s . For th is  p u rp o se , a n o th e r  S ecurity  
C ouncil re so lu tio n  w as  re q u ired , a n d  the  
drafting  w as led by the S tate  D epartm ent. This 
im m e d ia te ly  m a d e  it th e  ta r g e t  of a llied  
rem onstrations — C anadian rem onstrations not 
lea s t am ong them . The latter, indeed, were so
Private John Hoskins, 2nd Battalion, 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 
Infantry, during an advance on Hill 
419, Korea, 24 February 1951.
re ta in ing  h is m uch  larger role as 
com m ander of Am erican forces in 
th e  en tire  Pacific a rea . At one 
poin t it w as even suggested  th a t 
th e  field  of UN o p e ra tio n s  be 
defined in the proposed resolution 
by  p r e c i s e  g e o g ra p h ic a l  
coordinates, the principal purpose 
of w hich w ould be to es tab lish  
v e ry  e x p lic i t ly  t h a t  m il i ta ry  
o p e ra t io n s  a r is in g  o u t of th e  
C hina p rob lem  w ould n o t be a 
p a rt of the  UN m andate. On th is 
one, Hume Wrong actually balked, 
believing the initiative would not 
fly, and  th ink ing  in any case th a t 
it was too in trica te  a proposal to 
be advanced a t so late a stage in 
the  game.
Once again, none of th is had  
m u c h  p ra c tic a l effect, b u t  the  
point of C anadian  policy was clear 
enough, and  in retrospect it could 
be argued th a t it was impressively 
far-sighted . B ut I will come back 
to th a t in a m om ent.
plentiful an d  so in sisten tly  repeated  th a t  they 
eventually exasperated even Hume Wrong, whose 
unenviable task  it was to convey them  to harried  
A m erican  o ffic ia ls . T h e re  w ere  too m an y  
references in  the  proposed reso lu tion , O ttaw a 
thought, to the  “United S ta te s” an d  too few to 
the “United N ations.” Creeping un ila tera lism  
u n d er m ultilateral cover w as not w hat it h a d  in 
m ind. The geographic scope of the  operation, 
moreover, was not sufficiently well-defined. This 
w as because  there  w as too m uch  use  of the 
p h rase  “in the  a rea” — a p h rase  th a t h ad  first 
cropped u p  in  the reso lu tion  of J u n e  27, and  
one th a t failed (among other things) to guarantee 
th a t the  UN would not get caugh t u p  in a  w ider 
fracas involving the two Chinas. “M ission-creep” 
was no t then, as it is now, a term  th a t routinely 
s u rfa c e d  in  th e  v o c a b u la ry  of d ip lo m a tic  
discourse; b u t Ottawa feared it nonetheless, not 
least because General M acArthur would become 
the working com m ander of UN forces while still
In the m eantim e, there  w as the question  of 
w hat contribu tion  C anada m ight usefully m ake 
to the  conduct of the hostilities them selves. 
T hen , a s  now , th e  e a sy  s tu f f  cam e easily  
e n o u g h . T h ree  C a n a d ia n  d e s tro y e rs  w ere 
despatched  to the w estern  Pacific on Ju ly  5 and 
were su b seq u en tly  assigned  to M acA rthur’s 
com m and. Airlift support was similarly provided 
by the RCAF, an d  la ter augm ented  by civilian 
charters from C anadian Pacific Airlines. But the 
real issu e s  cen te red  on g ro u n d  forces. The 
governm ent’s first fear w as th a t there would be 
an  adverse reaction  in Quebec, b u t th a t soon 
d issipated  as it becam e clear th a t Quebecois in 
genera l (there  were a few exceptions) were 
broadly supportive of the UN initiative. The more 
im portan t problem , therefore, tu rn ed  ou t to be 
a practical one. It resulted  from the fact th a t the 
governm ent h ad  no com bat-ready  forces a t its 
d isposal to send  — not, a t least, forces th a t it 
was p repared  to d espatch  to a thea tre  in  Asia.
U ltim a te ly  it d e a lt  w ith  th is  p ro b le m  by 
announcing  on A ugust 7 the rec ru itm en t of a 
C a n a d ia n  A rm y S p ec ia l F o rce  for serv ice  
overseas. T hat service m ight well be in  Korea, 
b u t if the fighting w as over by the tim e the Force 
w as ready  to go, the troops w ould be sen t to 
Europe instead.
From  the point of view of my own argum ent, 
the m ost in teresting  featu re  of all th is  w as th a t 
the  decision w as tak en  som ew hat reluctan tly , 
and  very largely u n d e r p ressu re  from the UN 
Secretary-G eneral, Trygve Lie, who in tu rn  was 
reacting  to the  quite und ers tan d ab le  A m erican 
view th a t  it w as high tim e the allies s ta rted  
pu tting  up. They were not, after all, shu tting  up! 
B ut in paying their dues, the C anad ians once 
ag a in  so u g h t to  u se  th e  c u rre n c y  of th e ir  
contribution as a source of diplom atic leverage. 
In p a rt ic u la r , P e a rso n  in s is te d , f irs t, th a t  
C anad ian  troops no t be com m itted to the  front 
u n til th e ir own officers though t them  ready  for 
com bat, and second, th a t they would not in any 
c ircum stances be assigned  to the  defence of 
Form osa, an  en terprise  th a t w as no t p a rt of the 
UN C om m and’s m an d a te  in the  field. These 
g u aran tees  were forthcom ing, an d  the first of 
them  eventually proved very useful to C anadian 
forces in  Korea itself, w hen the orders reflecting 
th e m  h a d  to  be  u s e d  by th e  C a n a d ia n  
com m ander to fend off the b land ishm ents of his 
A m erican superio rs, who w anted  to deploy his 
troops to the front the  m om ent they arrived in 
th e  th e a tre , a n d  before th e ir  tra in in g  w as 
complete. The preoccupation with separating the 
Korean and  Form osan  issu es  was, of course, 
recu rren t, a lthough  in the end  it w as to be 
overrun  by o ther events.
Before then, however, there were to be other 
dip lom atic engagem en ts of relevance to my 
in te rp re ta t io n  of th e  ta le . T h ese  cam e In 
Septem ber-October 1950, w hen there was heavy 
A m erican p ressu re  on the UN to expand the 
scope of the K orean operation. This p ressu re  
came not from military failure, b u t from military 
success. South Korean and  American forces had 
m anaged during the sum m er, and  a t great cost, 
to bring the North Korean advance to a h a lt a t a 
defensive perim eter a ro u n d  the  po rt of P usan . 
This stab ilization  of the  fron t w as a crucial 
development, because it gave General MacArthur 
the tim e he needed to m arshal the supplies and 
reinforcements that an  effective counter-offensive
w o u ld  r e q u i r e .  W h en  h e  w a s  re a d y , he  
lau n ch ed  a tw o-pronged a ssa u lt aga in st h is 
N orth Korean adversaries — break ing  directly 
th ro u g h  the P u sa n  perim eter in  the  sou theast, 
while sim ultaneously launching an  am phibious 
a ttack  behind  enem y lines a t the port of Inchon 
in the  northw est. This m anoeuvre — a classic 
of its  k ind  — w as a n  a s tound ing  success, and  
in 11 days it led to the destruc tion  an d  cap ture  
of the  b u lk  of the  N orth K orean arm y. The 
cap ita l city, Seoul, w as in  the  h a n d s  of UN 
forces by the end of Septem ber, and  very shortly 
th ereafte r the rem n a n ts  of the N orth Korean 
arm y — less th a n  10 percen t of the  original 
to ta l — w ere d riven  b a c k  a c ro ss  th e  3 8 th  
p a ra lle l (w hich h a d  b e e n  th e  d iv id ing  line 
betw een the two Koreas in the first place).
This m ilitary  victory w as the  im m ediate 
s o u rc e  of a p o lic y  p ro b le m . On a  s t r i c t  
in te r p re ta t io n  of th e  o rig in a l in te n t ,  a n d  
consistent with a m inim alist view of the collective 
secu rity  principle, it could be argued  th a t  the 
UN’s m ission h ad  been  successfully completed. 
The aggression h ad  been  repelled, the victim 
lib e ra te d , a n d  th e  s ta tu s  quo a n te  bellum  
resto red . B ut if the  appetites of the  aggressors 
h ad  been  dulled, the appetites of the defenders 
— American and  South  Korean alike — had  been 
sharpened. The UN h ad  been on record for some 
tim e as favouring the peaceful reunification  of 
Korea u n d er dem ocratic auspices. The m ilitary 
capacity  of the  North w as now in d isarray . The 
S ou th  K oreans an d  the UN C om m and were in 
the ascendant, or could easily become so. In such 
c ircum stances, it w as hard ly  su rp ris in g  th a t 
Syngm an Rhee an d  G eneral M acA rthur (the 
la t te r  w ith  su p p o rt  from  W ashington) were 
u n ited  in w anting  to drive the victory hom e by 
taking their forces across the 38 th  parallel. This 
w ould  allow  th em  to com plete  th e  ta s k  of 
un ification  while the ir own iron w as hot, and  
while their enem y’s w as cold.
At f irs t, th e re  w as som e su g g e s tio n  in  
W ashington th a t the phraseology of the Ju n e  27 
a n d  Ju ly  5 reso lu tions of the Security  Council 
was sufficiently loose to w arran t their proceeding 
in  th is  way w ithou t fu rth e r au thority . North 
Korea, after all, could be said  to be “in the a rea” 
(although Pearson’s own view had  been th a t “the 
a re a ” in  question  shou ld  be tak en  to end a t the 
4 0 th  para lle l — th a t  is, no m ore th a n  120 
n a u tic a l  m iles n o r th  of th e  p re -h o s til it ie s
border). O ther m em bers of the  UN, however, 
C anada included, took the view th a t crossing the 
parallel in order to unify Korea by forces of arm s 
would am o u n t to a considerable escalation  of 
purpose, and  could lead to a dangerous response 
from the Soviet Union, an d  p e rh ap s also from 
C h in a . T h is  w a s  p r e c is e ly  th e  s o r t  of 
development th a t the C anadians had  feared from 
the very beg inn ing , a n d  som e of P e a rso n ’s 
colleagues u rged  h im  to oppose it. B u t the  
A m ericans were successfu l in p e rsu ad in g  the 
British and  o thers to support their position, and  
th is m ade con tinued  opposition  both  difficult 
and  po in tless . P earson  did suggest th a t  an  
a ttem p t be m ade before the  reso lu tio n  w as 
actually  p u t to a vote to open up  negotiations 
w ith the  N orth Korean regim e, since it w as 
conceivable th a t Pyongyang would accep t the 
defeat and reconcile itself to a  peaceful resolution 
of the underlying political problem . But the idea 
fell on d ea f ears . V arious o th e r  d ip lom atic  
initiatives were sim ilarly a ttem p ted  — som e of 
th e m  a im e d  a t  r e d u c in g  th e  f re e d o m  of 
m anoeuvre th a t India, in  particu lar, feared the 
A m ericans were giving to th e ir  irrepressib le  
thea tre  com m ander. The Lilliputians, in short, 
were still working h a rd  to contain  their Gulliver.
Eventually , however, P earson  h im self gave 
way, a lthough  only after securing  w hat he took 
to be an  inform al Am erican com m itm ent no t to 
allow UN troops to advance beyond the narrow  
w aist of the Korean p en in su la , abou t half-w ay 
between the 38th  parallel and  the Yalu River. The 
upsho t was th a t yet ano ther resolution (this one 
in the General Assembly, since the Soviet Union 
had  re tu rn ed  in A ugust to the Security  Council 
and  h ad  g round  its b u s in e ss  to a  halt) w as 
p asse d  w ith C a n a d a ’s re lu c ta n t su p p o rt on 
O c to b e r  7. In  e ffec t, it  a u th o r iz e d  a UN 
C om m and  ad v an ce  in to  N o rth  K orea a s  a 
prelude to the es tab lishm en t of a unified and  
dem ocratically elected governm ent th roughou t 
the peninsula.
The A m erican un d ertak in g  n o t to advance 
beyond the  p e n in su la ’s n a rro w  w aist — an  
undertak ing  rendered by the Secretary of State, 
D ean Acheson, a t a time w hen he was unaw are 
of certain  contrary  developm ents in W ashington 
— w as only p a rtly  a t  odds w ith  P re s id e n t 
T ru m a n ’s ac tu a l in s tru c tio n s  to M acA rthur, 
w hich enjoined him  no t to allow UN forces to 
penetrate  Korea’s no rthernm ost provinces. B ut
it w as com pletely a t odds w ith the G eneral’s 
own in ten t, as h is  su b seq u e n t advance to the 
Yalu River an d  the border w ith C hina readily 
dem onstra ted .
As we all know, th is las t offensive — the so- 
called “Home by C hristm as” offensive — w as to 
be rudely  in te rru p ted  by the  Chinese, who had  
show n up  in  the theatre  here and  there as early 
as the  end of October, b u t who now intervened 
in massive num bers a t the end of November. This 
m ade it all too evident th a t uniting  Korea u n d er 
western auspices was not an  objective th a t could 
be reconciled w ith Peking’s view of w hat C hina’s 
security  requ ired  — as the C hinese an d  the 
Indians h ad  tried repeatedly to m ake clear over 
the preceding m onths, an d  as the  C anad ians, 
am ong o thers , h ad  h a lf-su sp ec ted  from  the 
beginning. As a C anad ian  h isto rian  observed 
som e 53 years ago, C hina was “as unw illing to 
adm it such  a p lan  for Korea as the United S tates 
might have been if United Nations forces, mostly 
Chinese, had  been about to arrange for a people’s 
dem ocracy of Mexico.”6
The C anad ian  and  A m erican responses to 
the C hinese in tervention  were s tark ly  a t odds. 
For the Americans — still bruised by the success 
of M ao’s revolution, deeply influenced by the 
sway of the C hina Lobby, convinced in any case 
th a t com m unism  was bo th  a m onolithic and  a 
darkly m enacing threat to their security and their 
c iv iliza tion , a n d  now  su ffe rin g  s ig n if ic a n t 
casua lties  a t the  h a n d s  of a Red Army — there  
was only one possibility. An illicit and oppressive 
Chinese regime had  come to the aid of an  equally 
illicit and  oppressive aggressor in the community 
of nations. T hat m ade the governm ent in Peking 
a n  ag g resso r, too, a n d  it left no  room  for 
accom m odation. It had  to be labelled for w hat it 
was, an d  sub jec ted  to a h a rd  m ilitary lesson. 
No w eakness could be show n. C ertain ly  no 
reward could be given. A tough line was required.
For the C anadians, by con trast, there w as a 
n a tu ra l tendency to conclude th a t the course of 
events h a d  proven the ir h esita tions  righ t all 
along. E x p an d in g  th e  objectives of the  UN 
C om m and to include the forcible unification  of 
Korea h ad  been a m istake. The C hinese m ight 
be m isbehaving, b u t their m isbehaviour, in the 
circum stances, was easily understood. The need 
now w as to lim it the dam age — in effect, to 
contain  the hostilities by de-escalating them .
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Sherman tanks of “B” Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse, 
completing a tour ojfront-line duty in Korea, 16 July 1952.
In varying degrees, the  C anad ian  view was 
widely sha red  am ong o ther UN powers — allies 
and  n eu tra ls  alike. The resu lt w as a complex 
series of inform al exchanges in  New York and  
elsewhere focussing on the question  of w hether 
diplom atic overtures ought to be m ade directly 
to the  Peking governm ent. The U nited S ta tes 
clung to the view th a t any such  initiative would 
be ill-advised un til su c h  time as UN forces had  
regained the upper h an d  a t the front, b u t in the 
end they reluctan tly  agreed to a  lim ited ru n  a t 
th e  ta rg e t, on  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  th a t  an  
aggressor reso lu tion  would be b ro u g h t before 
the General Assembly if the a ttem p t were to fail 
(as th ey  w ere conv inced  it w ould). In the  
m eantim e, the diplomatic initiative was to be led
by a Cease-Fire G roup com posed of N asrollah 
E ntezam  of Iran , S ir Benegal R au  of India, and  
Lester Pearson of C anada.
The details of w hat followed are too intricate 
to w arran t dissection here. Suffice it to say th a t 
some of the resulting exchanges with the Chinese 
appeared  prom ising, b u t the ta lks u ltim ately 
foundered on the question of w hether the Peking 
re g im e  w o u ld  be  g r a n te d  in te r n a t io n a l  
recognition as the sole government of all of China 
— an  issue th a t would affect am ong other things 
the m atte r  of who in fu tu re  w ould occupy the 
“C h ina” sea t a t the  UN — in advance of any 
substan tive  d iscussion  of a  cease-fire in Korea. 
The A m ericans w ere ad am an tly  opposed  to
m aking  any  su c h  concession . Som e of the  
p layers  involved, in c lu d in g  th e  C a n ad ian s , 
thought there was still room for m anoeuvre, b u t 
in the end the United S tates insisted on bringing 
fo rw a rd  i ts  c o n d e m n in g  r e s o lu t io n . T he 
C anad ians, fearing th a t  con tinued  opposition 
would a lienate  the A m ericans entirely  while 
disrupting the all-im portant unity  of the w estern 
alliance, a t th a t  point th rew  in the towel. While 
describ ing the reso lu tion  as  “p rem atu re  and  
unwise,” they nonetheless voted in its favour, and 
the resolution was passed  on February  1, 1951. 
It b rough t to an  end any im m ediate p rospect of 
a negotiated cessation  of hostilities.
There were other diplom atic engagem ents of 
a sim ilar sort, som e of the m ore im portan t of 
th e m  c e n tr in g  on a c o n tro v e rsy  over th e  
repatriation of Chinese and  North Korean POWs 
in the final p h ases  of the war. B ut the general 
pa ttern  by then  had  been firmly established. The 
C an ad ian s  were certa in ly  supportive  of the  
w estern cause, and were determ ined to n u rtu re  
the un ity  of the  w estern  players. At the  sam e 
time, they w orked quite  h a rd  to co n stra in  the 
behav iour of Am erican policy-m akers, w hich 
th e y  r e g a r d e d  a s  o c c a s io n a l ly  g iv en  to  
counterproductive extremes. Their strategy was 
to act as m uch as possible in diplomatic coalition 
with o ther m em bers of the United N ations, a 
s tra te g y  th a t  u ltim a te ly  d e p e n d e d  on  th e  
w illingness of the  A m erican  a u th o r itie s  to 
o p era te  u n d e r  UN a u sp ic e s . U ltim ately , of 
course, C an ad a’s diplom atic capabilities, like 
those of the o ther con tribu to rs to the war, were 
lim ited by a t least one underly ing  reality. The 
A m ericans were paying m ost of the  p iper’s bill. 
It followed th a t they were calling m ost of the  
p iper’s tu n es . To sw itch the  m etaphor, C anada 
could nibble a t the m argins of Am erican policy, 
b u t no t a t the core.
Countervailing Views
Su ch  w as the  essence of my argum en t m ore th an  a quarter-cen tury  ago, and  self-serving 
though you m ay th ink me for saying so, it seem s 
to me to be hanging in there reasonably well even 
today. So sham eless am  I, in  fact, th a t I canno t 
res is t quoting  from w hat is probably  the m ost 
c o m p le te  a n d  s c h o la r ly  a c c o u n t  o f th e  
in ternational h istory  of the Korean War to date. 
W ritten by the A m erican h is to rian , W illiam
S tueck , on the  b as is  of h is  ana ly sis  of the  
p e rtin en t diplom atic files in  a wide a rray  of 
na tional archives, an d  pub lished  in 1995 by 
P rin ce to n  U niversity  P re ss , it offers in  its  
in troduction  the following observation:
A seco n d  th em e  [of th is  book] c e n te rs  on  th e  
role of th e  U nited  N ations, w hich  o th e r sch o la rs  
have w ritten  off a s  little m ore th a n  a n  in s tru m en t 
o f U .S. policy. To be su re , th e  in te rn a tio n a l 
o rg an iza tio n  often  p layed  th a t  role, b u t  j u s t  as  
often it provided the se tting  for allied an d  neu tra l 
p re s s u re  on  th e  U n ited  S ta te s , a n  in s ti tu tio n a l 
fram ew ork  w ith in  w h ich  w eak er n a tio n s  cou ld  
co o rd in a te  th e ir  efforts to in flu en ce  th e  w orld 's 
g r e a t e s t  p o w e r . S u c h  e f f o r t s  f r e q u e n t ly  
su c c e e d e d , in  p a r t  b e c a u s e  m a n y  of th o s e  
n a tio n s  h a d  con tribu ted  forces to Korea. The UN 
role in  th e  K orean War m erits  a tte n tio n  n o t only 
a s  a n  ag e n c y  of co llec tive  s e c u r ity  a g a in s t  
“ag g re s s io n ,” b u t  a s  a  c h a n n e l of r e s tra in t  on  a 
s u p e r p o w e r  t h a t  o c c a s io n a lly  f l ir te d  w ith  
excessively risk y  en d eav o rs .7
I could hard ly  have said  it b e tte r myself!
B ut of course I cannot get away so lightly as 
all th a t, an d  a t the m ost general level it is not 
difficult to m ount a  counter-interpretation, m uch 
less flattering (some m ight feel) to the C anadian  
position. For a  s ta rt, it is absolu tely  clear th a t 
all the  m ajor decisions on the “UN” side in  the 
K orean  W ar w ere u ltim a te ly  m ade by, an d  
dependent upon, the United S tates. Even where 
the A m ericans were actively opposed by their 
allies, they  alm ost always won the day in  the 
end. C anada had  no influence over the J u n e  25 
d ec is io n  ca llin g  on th e  N orth  K oreans to 
withdraw. Nor did it have any significant im pact 
on either the  tim ing or the  su b s tan ce  of the 
re so lu tio n  of J u n e  27, w h ich  invoked  the  
collective se cu rity  p rinc ip le . The A m erican 
decision to intervene w ith naval and  air forces 
was m ade in W ashington and  p u t into practical 
effect on a un ila te ra l basis. The United S ta tes, 
moreover, was in complete control of UN military 
operations, and  for som e of the  m ost im portan t 
p h ases  of the w ar (including m ost particu larly  
th e  ad v an ce  in to  N orth  Korea), “A m erican  
contro l” did no t m ean  control by the P resident 
and  Jo in t Chiefs of Staff, b u t by the increasingly 
uncon tro llab le  th ea tre  com m ander, G eneral 
M acArthur. W hen the A m ericans decided th a t 
they should  seize the opportunity  to unify Korea 
by  force of a rm s , th e y  c e r ta in ly  r a n  in to  
opposition. B ut then  they ra n  over it. C anada 
and  som e of the  o ther powers were successfu l
in delaying the condem nation  of the  Peking 
regime following the Chinese in tervention, b u t 
only for a relatively sh o rt time. Here, too, the 
Americans had  their way in the end, and  Ottawa 
a t th a t  po in t suppo rted  them , even if it did so 
while publicly holding its nose. All th is  being 
so, it is not im possible to m ake the case th a t 
C a n a d a  w as a c tin g  as  a loyal, a n d  clearly  
subordinate, m em ber of an  American-dominated 
coalition. To deny th is, it could be said, is to 
deny the essence. Everything else — minor, and 
usually  futile, displays of tactical disagreem ent 
w ith W ashington included — is sim ply clutter.
This k ind of in terpretation — although more 
frequently  m oun ted  la te r in rela tion  to the  w ar 
in V ietnam  th a n  to the  w ar in Korea — was 
certain ly  a t the root of m uch  of the  criticism  of 
C anadian  foreign policy on the political “left” (as 
well as in n a tio n a lis t circles m ore generally) 
du ring  the 1960s an d  into the early 1970s. On 
such  a view, Canada was not a  truly autonom ous 
power a t all, b u t  an  Am erican satellite  — and 
th e  g inger a p p ro a c h  th a t  O ttaw a  took  in  
calcu lating  how m uch  resistance  to Am erican 
preferences it could display w ithout runn ing  the 
risk  of being counterproductive told the  whole 
story.
On som e accoun ts , too, the  im plications of 
th is  s e n s i t iv i ty  to  th e  im b a la n c e  in  th e  
d istribu tion  of power betw een C anada  an d  the 
U nited S ta tes were com pounded fu rth e r by a 
fundam en ta l sim ilarity  betw een C anad ian  and  
A m erican views of the  cold w ar itself. C anada 
h ad  been one of the diplom atic arch itec ts of the 
N orth A tlantic Alliance, and  there  w as no th ing  
in  C anad ian  liberalism  th a t  w ould genera te  
sym pathy for the Soviet experiment. If there were 
genuine differences with the United States, these 
h a d  more to do w ith strateg ies an d  tactics th an  
w ith basic purposes. C anadians knew  very well 
w hich side they were on. In seeking to qualify 
the a rgum en t I h ad  m ade, therefore, Robert S. 
Prince wrote as follows in an  article pub lished  
in the  w inter of 1992-93:
...To be su re , C a n a d a  w a n te d  to  re s tra in  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s ; a t  tim es , C a n a d ia n  d ip lo m ats  
believed th a t  they  h a d  to carp  a t  th e  flaws in  US 
policy in  o rd e r to p reserve  w orld  p eace . B u t 
C a n a d a  w as itse lf c o n s tra in e d  by  th e  co s ts  of 
op p o sitio n  — th e  r isk  of c a u s in g  a  d a n g e ro u s  
s p l i t  in  th e  W e s te rn  a l l ia n c e  t h a t  m ig h t  
perm anen tly  so u r C anad ian -A m erican  re la tions
— a n d  a lso  by  th e  b a s ic  sim ila rity  of C a n a d ia n  
a n d  A m erican  p e rc e p tio n s  of th e  C old War. 
D espite the  rea l a n d  considerab le  s tra in  th a t  the  
K o re a n  W ar p la c e d  on  C a n a d ia n -A m e ric a n  
d ip lo m acy , th e re  w ere  s u c h  t ig h t lim its  on  
C a n a d a 's  ab ility  a n d  in c lin a tio n  to re s tra in  th e  
US th a t  a t  tim es d u rin g  th e  early  w a r period  the 
sim ilarity  of C an ad ian  an d  A m erican app roaches 
to K orea o u tsh o n e  th e  d ifferences.8
It is difficult to respond  very vigorously to 
th is  so rt of challenge, however, because  I agree 
w ith it entirely. If there  is a  difference betw een 
us, it is no t a  difference over the facts, b u t  over 
w hich of the facts are interesting. The question, 
in  o ther words, h a s  to do w ith w hich facts are 
w orthy of em phasis, a n d  w hich of them  can  be 
taken  (more or less) as self-evident. Writing from 
the vantage poin t of the late 1960s an d  early 
1970s, it hardly seem ed necessary  to argue th a t 
the  w estern  powers, C anada an d  the United 
S ta tes  included, were fundam entally  agreed in 
th inking th a t the  Sino-Soviet world represented 
a  b it of a th re a t to the liberal West. Nor did it 
seem  necessary , either, to em phasize th a t  the 
Am ericans had  the biggest battalions and  hence 
were bound to have the largest say. W hat seemed 
m uch  m ore su rp ris in g  w as th a t anyone else in 
the  w estern  cam p h ad  p resum ed  to have any 
say  a t all. Hence I m ade a great deal of the fact 
th a t the Canadians, among others, had  said quite 
a  lot. Robert Prince, by con trast, m ade a great 
deal of the  fact th a t they had  failed to say more, 
an d  th a t  they h a d  h a d  relatively little im pact in 
saying w hat they did say. This is a difference 
th a t probably says som ething respectively about 
D. S ta irs  and  R. Prince, b u t it is n o t in  itself a 
difference in our accounts of Canada’s diplomacy 
in  the context of the Korean War.
Having sa id  all th a t, I m u st concede as well 
th a t  the  opening  up  of the  E x terna l Affairs 
departm ent’s records for the period h as  brought 
to lig h t m an y  new  d e ta ils  of w h ich  I w as 
previously unaw are. I have not been through the 
files myself, b u t  the  work of those who have, 
along w ith the  selections th a t have been  m ade 
available th rough  the D epartm ent’s Documents 
on  C a n a d ia n  E x te r n a l  R e la tio n s  s e r ie s  
(especially Vols. 16-19) have together filled in 
the gaps. Greg Donaghy, for example, has  shown 
th a t there was very extensive discussion over the 
sum m er of 1950 of the possibility of exploiting 
the opportun ity  crea ted  by the  K orean War to 
establish a standing United Nations international
force th a t would continue long after the  m atte r 
in Korea h a d  been reso lved .9 Of th is , I w as 
completely unaw are. Similarly, it appears  from 
his account, as well as from th a t of Robert Prince, 
t h a t  w in n in g  C a b in e t  a p p ro v a l  fo r th e  
recruitm ent of the C anadian Army Special Force 
w as a far m ore difficult challenge th a n  I h ad  
previously understood  it to be. Again, Steven 
Hugh Lee h a s  dem onstra ted  th a t  the tensions 
th a t developed w ith the  A m ericans over the 
reso lu tion  of the  POW rep a tria tio n  issue  in the  
final m on ths of the w ar were far m ore volatile 
and  complex th an  I w as able in 1974 to report.10 
C hester R onning had  alluded  briefly in a  1966 
article to C an ad a’s having played an  im portan t 
role in cajoling the A m ericans into accepting a 
proposal th a t led to the  final se ttlem en t of th is  
i s s u e ,"  b u t  I w as u n a b le  th e n  to o b ta in  
additional inform ation.
It goes w ithout saying th a t  the h istorical 
record is m uch improved as a resu lt of im portant 
studies of this kind, and certainly those who wish 
to a s s e s s  th e  ro les p lay ed  resp ec tiv e ly  by 
particular individuals in the political leadership, 
as well as in the foreign service, cannot perform  
their ta sk s  effectively w ithout them .
B ut a t a  more general level of analysis, I still 
th ink C anadian policy-makers h ad  a reasonable 
ru n  a t tying Gulliver down. The fact th a t  he 
e v e n tu a l ly  b ro k e  fre e , a n d  d id  a lo t of 
unnecessary  damage in spite of us, simply spoke 
then , as it still speaks now, to the  fact th a t  he 
was, an d  is, a trifle bigger th a n  all the  o ther 
in hab itan ts  of Lilliput.
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